

# **Introdução às Alterações Climáticas no contexto do Desenvolvimento Sustentável**

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Formação em Alterações Climáticas no Contexto  
dos Recursos Hídricos

AESABESP

São Paulo, 7 a 8 de Agosto de 2012



# A Grande Aceleração

Desde o final da 2ª Guerra Mundial regista-se um crescimento muito pronunciado da população humana, da actividade económica, da produção e do consumo, do uso de recursos renováveis e não-renováveis, do transporte, dos fluxos de comunicação e informação, do conhecimento científico e das aplicações tecnológicas. Alguns autores designam este período de crescimento por “A Grande Aceleração” (Hibbard, 2007)

- A população humana aumentou 10 vezes nos últimos 3 séculos e por um factor de 4 no século XX, atingindo actualmente cerca de 6700 milhões. É muito provável que atinja cerca de 9200 milhões em 2050.
- A área urbana global cresceu por um factor de 10 no século XX. Actualmente cerca de metade da população mundial habita em cidades.


- No século XX a produção industrial cresceu por um factor de 40 e a utilização de energia por um factor de 16;
- Aproximadamente 50% da superfície terrestre está modificada pela acção humana;
- No século XX o consumo de água aumentou por um factor de 9. Actualmente é de 800 m<sup>3</sup> por ano e per capita: 65% para a agricultura; 25% para a indústria e cerca de 10% para consumo doméstico.

- Aumento da poluição do ar, da água e dos solos;
- Perda de biodiversidade: o ritmo actual de extinções é cerca de 100 a 10 000 vezes superior (valor mais provável 1000) ao pré-humano, que era de, aproximadamente, uma espécie por  $10^6$  espécies por ano (E.O. Wilson);


As actividades humanas exercem actualmente uma interferência significativa sobre os sistemas terrestres à escala global, como por exemplo, o sistema climático. Iniciou-se uma nova época que P. Crutzen e E.F. Stoermer designam por **Antropocénica.**

# A GRANDE ACELERAÇÃO


## População




## PIB Mundial




## Investimento Estrangeiro Directo




## Barragens nos Rios



## Uso mundial de Água




## Consumo de Fertilizantes




# A GRANDE ACELERAÇÃO


## População urbana




## Consumo de papel




## Veículos Automóveis



## Comunicações telefônicas



## Turismo internacional






FIGURE 5.14 World population history for the last million years, with the number of years before 1992 and population size both plotted on logarithmic scales. Different symbols represent estimates from different sources. SOURCE OF DATA: Appendix 2

Source: Joel E. Cohen,  
1995






Figure 5.13 – Deevey’s schema of world population history for the last million years, with the number of years before the present population size both plotted of logarithmic scales. Source: Deevey (1960, p. 198)





**Figure 3.2-1**

Growing energy input in gigajoule (GJ) per capita per year, and material input in t per capita per year in the wake of the Neolithic and Industrial Revolutions in industrialised countries (estimated). DS = tonnage stated as dry substance. Source: based on Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1998





FIGURE 5.12 World population history for the last two millennia, with population plotted on a logarithmic scale. Different symbols represent estimates from different sources. SOURCE OF DATA: Appendix 2

Source: Joel E. Cohen,  
1995

Figure 1. Population of the world, 1950-2050, by projection variants



Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2005). *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Highlights*. New York: United Nations.





FIGURE 5.11 Four hypothetical populations growing according to the exponential (solid rectangles), logistic (+ symbols), doomsday (• symbols) and sum-of-exponential (open squares) models. Population size is plotted on a logarithmic scale.


Source: Joel E. Cohen, 1995

Figure 1. Population of the world, 1950-2050, by projection variants




Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2005). *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Highlights*. New York: United Nations.

Figure 2. Population dynamics by development groups, 1950-2050




Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2005). *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Highlights*. New York: United Nations.



Frequency distribute of estimates of how many people the Earth can support


Source: Joel E. Cohen, 1995

- As iniquidades de desenvolvimento são cada vez maiores. A razão entre o PIB per capita dos países mais ricos e mais pobres está a aumentar assustadoramente: em 1820 era de 7, aumentou para 11 em 1910, 30 em 1960 e 74 em 1997.




**Figure 6.3.** Accroissement des inégalités de richesse depuis 1950. Rapport des revenus cumulés des 10 % les plus riches sur les 10 % les plus pauvres (UNDP, *Human Development Reports*).

Figure 9: Income Distribution in the USA: Income Shares by Groups



Source: US Census Bureau

Figure 11: Real Household income by Income Groups in the USA



Source: US Census Bureau

**Table 7-9 Large differences in levels of poverty (per cent)**

<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>HPI-1</b>
<i>Five countries with the lowest levels of poverty</i>	
Barbados	2.5
Uruguay	3.6
Chile	4.1
Cost Rica	4.4
Cuba	5.0
<i>Five countries with the highest levels of poverty</i>	
Zimbabwe	52.0
Mali	55.1
Ethiopia	56.0
Burkina Faso	58.6
Niger	61.8
<b>Developed countries</b>	<b>HPI-2</b>
<i>Five countries with the lowest levels of poverty</i>	
Sweden	6.5
Norway	7.2
Finland	8.4
Netherlands	8.4
Denmark	9.1
<i>Five countries with the highest levels of poverty</i>	
Belgium	12.4
Australia	12.9
UK	14.8
Ireland	15.3
USA	15.8


HPI – The Human Poverty Index (per cent) includes income and other factors, such as life span and illiteracy. The HPI is defined differently for developing and developed countries.


**Example:** Only 2.5 per cent of the population in Barbados live in poverty, but the figure is 61.8 per cent in Niger. Only 6.5 per cent of the population in Sweden live in poverty, but 15.8 per cent in the USA.

Figure 6 **Happiness and average annual income**<sup>15</sup>



# Densidade demográfica em 1995 com uma resolução espacial de 2.5 arc-min latitude/longitude (CIESIN)






Source: S. W. Dunning

Ocean Data: M.J. Behrenfeld (Oregon State Univ.)  
Land Data: S.W. Running (Univ. of Montana)  
Movie: R. Stöckli (NASA Earth Observatory)

Net Primary Productivity [kgC/m<sup>2</sup>/year]



JAN 2000



# Quadrado da Insustentabilidade


Desigualdades e Iniquidades de  
Desenvolvimento

Pobreza extrema e severa

Segurança  
Alimentar,  
escassez de  
água, perda de  
biodiversidade


Sustentabilidade  
dos sistemas de  
Energia

Alterações  
Climáticas



- 1 – Os 4 factores de insustentabilidade estão fortemente interligados e interdependentes
- 2 – Não é possível atingir o desenvolvimento sustentável sem procurar resolver os 4 desafios de forma integrada e simultânea

# Fronteiras Planetarias



Nature, 461(2009) 472, 24 September


# PLANETARY BOUNDARIES

Earth-system process	Parameters	Proposed boundary	Current status	Pre-industrial value
Climate change	(i) Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration (parts per million by volume)	350	387	280
	(ii) Change in radiative forcing (watts per metre squared)	1	1.5	0
Rate of biodiversity loss	Extinction rate (number of species per million species per year)	10	>100	0.1-1
Nitrogen cycle (part of a boundary with the phosphorus cycle)	Amount of N <sub>2</sub> removed from the atmosphere for human use (millions of tonnes per year)	35	121	0
Phosphorus cycle (part of a boundary with the nitrogen cycle)	Quantity of P flowing into the oceans (millions of tonnes per year)	11	8.5-9.5	-1
Stratospheric ozone depletion	Concentration of ozone (Dobson unit)	276	283	290
Ocean acidification	Global mean saturation state of aragonite in surface sea water	2.75	2.90	3.44
Global freshwater use	Consumption of freshwater by humans (km <sup>3</sup> per year)	4,000	2,600	415
Change in land use	Percentage of global land cover converted to cropland	15	11.7	Low
Atmospheric aerosol loading	Overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere, on a regional basis		To be determined	
Chemical pollution	For example, amount emitted to, or concentration of persistent organic pollutants, plastics, endocrine disruptors, heavy metals and nuclear waste in, the global environment, or the effects on ecosystem and functioning of Earth system thereof		To be determined	

Boundaries for processes in red have been crossed. Data sources: ref. 10 and supplementary information

**FIGURE 2.3**


## Patterns of risk change: environmental transitions and human development



Source: Based on Hughes, Kuhn and others (2011).


**ENERGIA**

# Revolução Energética




Fonte, P. Weiss, 2004

# 1973 and 2003 Fuel Shares of TPES\*



6 034 Mtoe




10 579 Mtoe

\*Excludes international marine bunkers and electricity trade.

\*\*Other includes geothermal, solar, wind, heat, etc.

## 2003 Fuel Shares of World Total Primary Energy Supply\*



\* TPES is calculated using the IEA conventions (physical energy content methodology). It includes international marine bunkers and excludes electricity/heat trade. The figures include both commercial and non-commercial energy.

\*\* Geothermal, solar, wind, tide/wave/ocean.


\*\*\* Includes non-renewable waste.

Source: IEA Energy Statistics


# Fuel Shares of TPES\* in 2010 and 2030

2010

2030



**12 200 Mtoe**




**16 500 Mtoe**

\* Includes bunkers.

\*\* Other includes combustible renewables & waste, geothermal, solar, wind, tide, etc

# A Matriz Energética Brasileira


## Oferta Interna de Energia - Brasil (2009)



Fonte: Balanço Energético Nacional - BEN


Nota: \*Inclui lenha, carvão vegetal e outras renováveis

# A Matriz Energética Brasileira



Fonte: MME


# O Diferencial Brasil




## 2. Renováveis

Buscar manter elevada a participação de energia renovável na matriz elétrica, preservando posição de destaque que o Brasil sempre ocupou no cenário internacional

Oferta Interna de Energia Elétrica 2007




# Procura mundial de energia primária por tipo de fonte no cenário de referência da AIE




- *Global demand grows by 40% between 2007 and 2030,*
- *with coal use rising most in absolute terms*

# Procura mundial de energia primária no cenário de referência da AIE



- *Non-OECD countries account for 93% of the increase in global demand*
- *between 2007 & 2030, driven largely by China & India*


# Numero de pessoas sem acesso a electricidade em 2008 e 2030 no cenário de referência da AIE




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps included in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IEA.

***\$35 billion per year more investment than in the Reference Scenario would be needed to 2030 – equivalent to just 5% of global power-sector investment – to ensure universal access***

# World fossil fuels & population



# Global Oil Production – Onshore and Offshore, Conventional and Unconventional



Source: Energyfiles, Energy Information Administration, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Wood Mackenzie As of 12/31/10

# Extreme Energy – Energia Extrema

Unconventional oil – Petróleo Não Convencional

Oil sands – Areias betuminosas (Canadá)

Tight oil – Xistos petrolíferos (Dakota do Norte, EUA)

Offshore deepwater – Offshore muito profundo

Unconventional gas – Gás Não Convencional

Shale gas – Gás de xisto (EUA)



# AREIAS BETUMINOSAS





Alberta Tar Sands

© Garth Lenz








Gás de xisto: Emissões de gases com efeito de estufa comparáveis ao do carvão quando se contabilizam as emissões de metano durante O processo de exploração

**HYDRAULIC FRACTURING**



**UNDERGROUND AQUIFER**


**HYDROFRAC ZONES**

**GÀS DE XISTO**




© June 2008, WVSORO  
[www.wvsoro.org](http://www.wvsoro.org)

Anthropogenic atmospheric carbon dioxide, fossil fuel emissions, world gross domestic product (GDP), and world population for the past century. Carbon dioxide data from Antarctic ice cores (green points), Mauna Loa Observatory (red curve), and the global network (blue dots).



# Energy demand and GDP (over time)



Source: *Drivers of the Energy Scene*, World Energy Council (2003)

**Table 4.1-3**

Potential emissions as a consequence of the use of fossil reserves and resources. Also illustrated is their potential for endangering the 2°C guard rail. This risk is expressed as the factor by which, assuming complete exhaustion of the respective reserves and resources, the resultant CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would exceed the 750 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> budget permissible from fossil sources until 2050 (Box 1.1-1). The figures refer to CO<sub>2</sub> alone, other greenhouse gases have not been taken into account. They are based on the values in Table 4.1-2.

Source: based on Table 4.1-1 and GEA, 2011

	Historical production up to 2008	Production in 2008	Reserves	Resources	Further occurrences	Total: reserves, resources and further occurrences	Factor by which these emissions alone exceed the 2°C emissions budget
	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	[Gt CO <sub>2</sub> ]	
<b>Conventional oil</b>	505	13	494	386	–	880	1
<b>Unconventional oil</b>	39	2	295	2,637	3,646	6,577	9
<b>Conventional gas</b>	194	7	343	459	27,977	28,778	38
<b>Unconventional gas</b>	15	1	3,987	5,300	–	9,287	12
<b>Coal</b>	666	14	1,970	41,277	–	43,247	58
<b>Total fossil fuels</b>	1,419	37	7,088	50,060	31,622	88,770	118

# Água

- A Terra é o “Planeta Azul”, o único onde existe água em abundância no estado líquido;
- Foi esta característica que permitiu o aparecimento de vida na Terra há 4100 a 3900 milhões de anos;
- A água é um recurso renovável que o ciclo hidrológico, movido pela energia solar, disponibiliza continuamente.


- Reserva total do planeta  $1,4 \times 10^9 \text{ Km}^3$

Água salgada 97,5%


Água doce 2,5%

## Principais reservatórios de água doce do ciclo hidrológico

	<b>Volume (1 000 Km<sup>3</sup>)</b>	<b>Porcentagem do Total</b>
<b>Águas subterrâneas</b>	10 530	30.1
<b>Humidade dos solos</b>	16,5	0.05
<b>Glaciares e cobertura permanente de neve</b>	24 064	68.7
<b>Camada do solo permanentemente gelado ("permafrost")</b>	300	0.86
<b>Lagos</b>	91	0.26
<b>Zonas Húmidas</b>	11.5	0.03
<b>Rios</b>	2.1	0.006
<b>Biota</b>	1.1	0.003
<b>Vapor de água atmosférico</b>	12.9	0.04
<b>Total</b>	35 029	100




Região da Foz do Amazonas




Annual global flows of the Earth's water cycle; the totals (in Gt/year) are from Oki (1999)

- Escoamento total anual dos continentes para os oceanos é de 40 000 Km<sup>3</sup>, cerca de 2/3 sob a forma de cheias. Regularmente utilizáveis actualmente são apenas 14 000 Km<sup>3</sup> o que corresponde a uma captação média anual superior a 2 000 m<sup>3</sup>, valor que é plenamente suficiente
- **Problema está nas profundas assimetrias espaciais da precipitação entre diferentes regiões do globo e temporais ao longo do ano**

- Cerca de 1100 milhões de pessoas não têm acesso a água comprovadamente potável;
- Cerca de 2600 milhões de pessoas não têm casas de banho ou outras formas de saneamento básico;
- Mais de 5 milhões de pessoas morrem por ano devido a doenças provocadas pela poluição das águas de consumo corrente, ou seja, cerca de 10 vezes o número anual médio de vítimas de guerras e conflitos armados recentes.



**Freshwater availability,  
cubic metres per person and per year, 2007.**




■ Data non available

Source: FAO, Nations unies,  
World Resources Institute (WRI).

Philippe BOUAFIA  
FEBRUARY 2008

**Figure 3.3 Meat is much more water intensive than major crops**  
(liters of water per kilogram of product)



*Source:* Waterfootprint (<https://www.waterfootprint.org>), accessed May 15, 2009; Gleick 2008.


*Note:* Chart shows liters of water needed to produce one kilogram of product or one liter of milk. Water use for beef production refers only to intensive production system.

# Desertificação

- Cerca de 41,3% da superfície terrestre emergida são terras sub-húmidas secas, semi-áridas, áridas e hiper-áridas (desertos), designados por “terras secas” ou “drylands”.
- Nas “Terras secas” habitam 2250 milhões de pessoas, ou seja, cerca de 34,7% da população mundial;
- Nas “Terras secas” a produção agrícola e florestal e outros serviços dos ecossistemas estão limitados pela escassez de água.

# PRESENT-DAY DRYLANDS AND THEIR CATEGORIES

Drylands include all terrestrial regions where the production of crops, forage, wood and other ecosystem services are limited by water. Formally, the definition encompasses all lands where the climate is classified as dry subhumid, semiarid, arid or hyper-arid. This classification is based on Aridity Index values<sup>†</sup>.



<sup>†</sup> The long-term mean of the ratio of an area's mean annual precipitation to its mean annual potential evapotranspiration is the Aridity Index (AI).


**Notes:** The map is based on data from UNEP Geo Data Portal (<http://geodata.grid.unep.ch/>). Global area based on Digital Chart of the World data (147,573,196.6 square km); Data presented in the graph are from the MA core database for the year 2000.

- Desertificação é a degradação dos solos nas terras áridas, semi-áridas e sub-húmidas secas;
- A desertificação atinge actualmente cerca de 10 a 20% da área total das regiões áridas, semi-áridas e sub-húmidas secas e constitui um dos mais graves problemas ambientais de âmbito global devido à relação estreita entre a degradação dos solos e a produção alimentar.

# Biodiversidade

- A biodiversidade de uma região é a totalidade dos seus genes, espécies e ecossistemas;
- Os ecossistemas naturais providenciam à humanidade um vasto e diversificado conjunto de serviços essenciais à vida: ciclo do carbono, equilíbrio do oxigénio atmosférico; geração, manutenção e fertilidade dos solos; novos medicamentos; valores educativos, culturais, estéticos e éticos, etc.


- É possível que se esteja na 6ª extinção maciça de espécies, esta com origem nas actividades humanas;
- Foram identificadas e descritas cientificamente cerca de 1,75 milhões de espécies, mas é provável que o número total seja muito maior, da ordem de 14 milhões;
- A actual taxa de extinção de espécies é superior por um factor de 100 a 10 000, à taxa natural de extinção livre da interferência antropogénica, cujo valor é da ordem de 1 espécie por milhão e por ano.



# Desflorestação

- Desde o surgimento da agricultura, há cerca de 10 000 anos, a área florestal global reduziu-se da ordem de 20% a 25%.
- As florestas tropicais húmidas, apesar de cobrirem apenas cerca de 6% da superfície terrestre, constituem o habitat de mais de 50% e possivelmente 90% das espécies da fauna e flora do nosso planeta.

## Deforestation in Latin America between 1990-2000




**Figure 13.2.** Total deforestation in Latin America (Mha) between 1990 and 2000. Number indicates deforestation rate (%/yr) for each country. Based on FAO (2001a).

Fonte, IPCC


- As florestas das zonas temperadas da América do Norte e da Eurásia estabilizaram ou estão a crescer enquanto que as florestas tropicais continuam em declínio acentuado;
- De acordo com várias estimativas, a manutenção do actual ritmo de desflorestação da floresta tropical húmida irá conduzir à sua extinção nos próximos 100 anos;
- Cerca de 15% a 25% das actuais emissões globais de CO<sub>2</sub> para a atmosfera resultam da desflorestação.

## Causes of Deforestation in the Amazon, 2000-2005






Deforestation in Amazonia, seen from satellite. The roads in the forest follow a typical "fishbone" pattern



**Extent of deforestation in Borneo 1950-2005, and projection towards 2020.** The tropical lowland and highland forests of Borneo, including vast expanses of rainforest, have decreased rapidly after the end of the second world war. Forests are burned, logged and clear, and commonly replaced with agricultural land, built-up areas or palm oil plantations. These areas represent habitat for species, such as Orangutan and elephants

# RECURSOS NATURAIS

# Pegada Ecológica da Humanidade



A procura por parte da Humanidade dos recursos naturais renováveis excede a capacidade regenerativa do planeta em cerca de 30% actualmente

**Pre-recession (2000-2008) Global NNR Scarcity Summary**


<b>Extremely Scarce (6)</b>	<b>Very Scarce (21)</b>	<b>Moderately Scarce (22)</b>	<b>Marginally Scarce (1)</b>	<b>Not Scarce (7)</b>
Bromine Gold Mercury Tantalum Tellurium Thallium	Aluminum Bauxite Cadmium Cement Chromium Copper Fluorspar Magnesium Compounds Molybdenum Natural Gas Nickel Nitrogen (Ammonia) Oil Phosphate Rock Potash REM Rhenium Selenium Strontium Sulfur Tungsten	Antimony Beryllium Bismuth Coal Cobalt Gallium Germanium Graphite Gypsum Indium Iron Ore Lead Lime Manganese Salt Silicon Silver Soda Ash Tin Vanadium Zinc Zirconium	PGM	Arsenic Barite Boron Diamond Garnet Lithium Niobium

Fonte: Energy Bulletin, 2010

### Permanent Global NNR Supply Shortfall (by 2030) Probability Summary

Nearly Certain Probability (5)	Very High Probability (8)	High Probability (10)	Low Probability (3)
Cadmium Gold Mercury Tellurium Tungsten	Cobalt Lead Molybdenum PGM Phosphate Rock Silver Titanium Zinc	Chromium Coal Copper Indium Iron Ore Lithium Magnesium Compounds Natural Gas Nickel Oil Phosphate Rock	Bauxite REM Tin

# GMO Commodity Index: The Great Paradigm Shift




Note: The GMO commodity index is an index comprised of the following 33 commodities, equally weighted at initiation: aluminum, coal, coconut oil, coffee, copper, corn, cotton, diammonium phosphate, flaxseed, gold, iron ore, jute, lard, lead, natural gas, nickel, oil, palladium, palm oil, pepper, platinum, plywood, rubber, silver, sorghum, soybeans, sugar, tin, tobacco, uranium, wheat, wool, zinc.

## Exhibit E1

**Commodity prices have increased sharply since 2000, erasing all the declines of the 20th century**

MGI Commodity Price Index (years 1999–2001 = 100)<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> See the methodology appendix for details of the MGI Commodity Price Index.

<sup>2</sup> 2011 prices are based on average of the first eight months of 2011.


SOURCE: Grilli and Yang; Stephan Pfaffenzeller; World Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); UN Comtrade; McKinsey analysis

Resource Revolution, McKinsey, 2011

## Exhibit 1

### Average commodity prices have fallen by almost 50 percent over the past century

MGI Commodity Price Index (years 1999–2001 = 100)<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> See our methodology appendix for details of the MGI Commodity Price Index.

SOURCE: Grilli and Yang; Pfaffenzeller; World Bank; IMF; OECD statistics; FAO; UN Comtrade; McKinsey analysis

**3 billion** more middle-class consumers  
expected to be in the global  
economy by 2030

**80%** rise in steel demand  
projected from  
2010 to 2030

**147%** increase in real  
commodity prices since  
the turn of the century

**44 million**  
people driven into poverty  
by rising food prices in  
the second half of 2010,  
according to the World Bank

**100%** increase in the average  
cost to bring a new oil  
well on line over the  
past decade


Up to **\$1.1 trillion**  
spent annually on resource subsidies

*The challenge*

Resource Revolution  
McKinsey, 2011


# Percentage of World GDP (last 500 years)

China, India, Japan, Latin America, Western Europe, and United States




# SEGURANÇA ALIMENTAR

# 10-Year Average Annual Growth in Crop Yields



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations As of 12/31/09

### Tons of Fertilizer Used Annually (per sq km of cropland)



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations As of 12/31/08



## World food prices reach new historic peak

03-02-2011

**3.4 percent surge in January - FAO updates Food Price Index** 3 February 2011, Rome - World food prices surged to a new historic peak in January, for the seventh consecutive month, according to the <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/> a commodity basket that regularly tracks monthly changes in global food prices.

"The new figures clearly show that the upward pressure on world food prices is not abating," said FAO economist and grains expert Abdolreza Abbassian. "These high prices are likely to persist in the months to come. High food prices are of major concern especially for low-income food deficit countries that may face problems in financing food imports and for poor households which spend a large share of their income on food."


"The only encouraging factor so far stems from a number of countries, where - due to good harvests - domestic prices of some of the food staples remain low compared to world prices," Abbassian added.

# Why food prices are rising

- Climate change, which leads to droughts, floods and storm, and thus to crop failures;
- The cultivation of biofuels, which takes valuable farmland out of food production;
- The global population, which is growing too fast for agricultural production to keep up;
- The emerging economies China and India, whose citizens are consuming greater quantities of higher quality food;
- The rising price of oil, which makes it more expensive to produce and ship food products;
- The rise in meat consumption, which means that more grain is needed for animal feed;
- Decades of neglecting agriculture, especially in hunger-prone regions.

## Per capita consumption of major food items in developing countries, 1961–2005


Index (1961 = 100)



- Eggs
- Meat
- Milk
- Cereals
- Roots and tubers


# Speculators at Work

Volume of corn in millions of tons



Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream; LBBW Commodity Research


# Hunger in a World of Plenty



World Food Summits  
1974, 1996, 2002


MDGs 2000

34 Years of Failure to Deliver



The debilitating pain of hunger: Not Just Numbers but real Faces and Voices


Millions




Note: Figures for 2009 and 2010 are estimated by FAO with input from the United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Full details of the methodology are provided in the technical background notes (available at [www.fao.org/publication/sofi/en/](http://www.fao.org/publication/sofi/en/)).

Source: FAO.

# More than 1.02 billion hungry people




\*Millions of people




3.7

Environmental constraints to rain-fed agriculture, reference climate 1961-90




3.8

Environmental constraints to rain-fed agriculture, HadCM3-A1FI 2080s



3.12a

Suitability for rain-fed cereals, reference climate 1961-90.



3.12b

Change in suitability for rain-fed cereals, HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s

# Quadrado da Insustentabilidade


Desigualdades e Iniquidades de  
Desenvolvimento

Pobreza extrema e severa

Segurança  
Alimentar,  
escassez de  
água, perda de  
biodiversidade


Sustentabilidade  
dos sistemas de  
Energia

Alterações  
Climáticas




# Percentage of World GDP (last 500 years)

China, India, Japan, Latin America, Western Europe, and United States




# U.S. Gross Federal Debt as a Percentage of GDP




# A crisis like no other – World GDP fell for the first time in the last 30 years


Evolution of world GDP  
10<sup>6</sup> million dollars




# Where we are improving



# Where we are not improving





On 15 August 1987, the total ozone measured above Halley Bay was 296 Dobson units; on 7 October, at the same site, it was 128 Dobson units. Balloon measurements showed that all of the ozone at an altitude of 16.5 kilometres (corresponding to a pressure of just under 100 mbar) had gone. On 15 August, at an altitude where the pressure was 70 mbar (16.5 km), ozone made up just over one-millionth of the atmosphere; on 7 October, at the same altitude, it was undetectable.  
 (Figure supplied by Joe Farman)

$$1\text{mbar} = 10^{-3}\text{ bar} = 100\text{ Nm}^{-2} = 100\text{ Pa}$$





Image of the largest Antarctic ozone hole ever recorded (Sep. 2006).



Nuvens estratosféricas polares



Lowest value of ozone measured by TOMS each year in the ozone hole

# Decrescimento do Ozono estratosférico







Figure 1. Projected Concentrations of Atmospheric Chlorine.

Source: DuPont Fluorochemicals,  
M.J. Prather, personal communication

# Temperature of Planet Earth





Reconstituição da evolução da temperatura média global da baixa atmosfera, representada por meio da anomalia relativamente à média do período de 1961 a 1990, e da concentração atmosférica do CO<sub>2</sub> nos últimos 400 000 anos (Petit, 1999). Figura adaptada de EEA, 2004. Repare-se na correlação que se observa entre os dois registos. O aumento da concentração do CO<sub>2</sub> a partir da revolução industrial e até ao presente está indicado por um vector aproximadamente vertical devido à escala de tempo utilizada na figura

**Fonte, Petit et al., 1999**




Figure 2.7 A comparison of the Earth's climate system during interglacial and glacial intervals.






Figure 8.7 Diagrams showing the vegetation cover of Europe during glacial maxima and interglacials.




(a)



(b)




From R.C. Wilson et al., 2000





Fonte, IPCC

# Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide


Measured at Mauna Loa, Hawaii





Evolução das concentrações de vários componentes da atmosfera (IPCC, 2001a). (a) Concentrações de três dos principais gases com efeito de estufa (GEE), com emissões antropogénicas – CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> e N<sub>2</sub>O – nos últimos 1 000 anos. Dados obtidos a partir de furos nos gelos da Antárctica e Gronelândia e de observações directas nas últimas décadas (indicada por uma linha no caso do CO<sub>2</sub>). No gráfico relativo ao CH<sub>4</sub> a curva representa a média global. O forçamento radiativo provocado pela presença destes gases na atmosfera está representado à direita. No caso do CH<sub>4</sub> e N<sub>2</sub>O a concentração está representada em partes por milhão de milhão em volume (ppmmv). (b) Concentrações de sulfatos obtidas a partir de furos nos gelos da Gronelândia em três locais (curvas) e emissões totais de SO<sub>2</sub> na Europa e nos Estados Unidos da América (indicadas com +).


**Fonte, IPCC**



Rough breakdown of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2004.

Source: WBGU, based on IPCC, 2007c


# Emissiones de GEE por sector 2007




**Emissiones no relacionadas con la energía**

**Emissiones relacionadas con la energía**

# Emisiones Brasileiras de CO<sub>2</sub>




- Mudanças no usos da terra e florestas
- Queima de combustíveis - indústria
- Queima de combustíveis - transporte
- Queima de combustíveis - outros Setores
- Emissões fugitivas
- Processos industriais




**Fonte, SIAM**

# Global Land–Ocean Temperature Index



# Global Mean Temperature




- Annual mean
- Smoothed series
- 5-95% decadal error bars


	Period	Rate
	Years	°C per decade
■	25	0.177±0.052
■	50	0.128±0.026
■	100	0.074±0.018
■	150	0.045±0.012

## Varição da Temperatura Média Global à Superfície


Média 2001-2007 em relação 1951-80 (+0,54° C)



1979




2005



# Redução do Gelo Oceânico no Ártico

Cambios en la cantidad de hielo (Gt)



Ano



Fonte: NASA -University of California Irvine. 2010.


# Sea level is rising faster than predicted

Surface melt on Greenland  
ice sheet descending into  
moulin, a vertical shaft  
carrying the water to base  
of ice sheet.



*Source: Roger Braithwaite*



# Current Arctic Conditions



# Projected Arctic Conditions




**Figure TS.16.** *Vegetation of the Arctic and neighbouring regions. Top: present-day, based on floristic surveys. Bottom: modelled for 2090-2100 under the IS92a emissions scenario. [F15.2]*

# Sea level is rising faster than predicted

Surface melt on  
Greenland ice sheet  
descending into moulin, a  
vertical shaft carrying the  
water to base of ice  
sheet.

*Source: Roger Braithwaite*







*Pasterze Glacier 1875*



*Pasterze Glacier (site), Austria*

© 2004 Gary Braasch



1940



1982



1998



2002



2005

### **Evolution of the Chacaltaya Glacier in Bolivia**

Source: Photographs by B. Francou and E. Ramirez and archive photographs


Table 13.3. *Glacier retreat trends.*


Glaciers/Period	Changes/Impacts
Peru <sup>a, b</sup> Last 35 years	22% reduction in glacier total area; reduction of 12% in freshwater in the coastal zone (where 60% of the country's population live). Estimated water loss almost 7,000 Mm <sup>3</sup>
Peru <sup>c</sup> Last 30 years	Reduction up to 80% of glacier surface from small ranges; loss of 188 Mm <sup>3</sup> in water reserves during the last 50 years.
Colombia <sup>d</sup> 1990-2000	82% reduction in glaciers, showing a linear withdrawal of the ice of 10-15 m/yr; under the current climate trends, Colombia's glaciers will disappear completely within the next 100 years.
Ecuador <sup>e</sup> 1956-1998	There has been a gradual decline glacier length; reduction of water supply for irrigation, clean water supply for the city of Quito, and hydropower generation for the cities of La Paz and Lima.
Bolivia <sup>f</sup> Since mid-1990s	Chacaltaya glacier has lost half of its surface and two-thirds of its volume and could disappear by 2010. Total loss of tourism and skiing.
Bolivia <sup>f</sup> Since 1991	Zongo glacier has lost 9.4% of its surface area and could disappear by 2045-2050; serious problems in agriculture, sustainability of 'bofedales' <sup>1</sup> and impacts in terms of socio-economics for the rural populations.
Bolivia <sup>f</sup> Since 1940	Charquini glacier has lost 47.4% of its surface area.

<sup>a</sup>Vásquez, 2004; <sup>b</sup>Mark and Seltzer, 2003; <sup>c</sup>NC-Perú, 2001; <sup>d</sup>NC-Colombia, 2001; <sup>e</sup>NC-Ecuador, 2000; <sup>f</sup>Francou et al., 2003.

Fonte, IPCC


# Radiative Forcing Components






**Solar Constant Variations 1978-2003**

# Observed and modelled sea level rise



Rahmstorf, Cazenave, Church, Hansen, Keeling, Parker and Somerville  
(Science, 2008)



Rahmstorf, 2007



**1999**



**2004**


© GARY BRASCH



*Cape Hatteras Beach Erosion • © 2004 Gary Braasch*




FUNAFUTI, TUVALU, MAIN ISLAND OF NATION ONLY 4 METERS HIGH IN SO.  
PACIFIC, THREATENED BY SEA LEVEL RISE. © 2005 GARY BRAASCH



Rahmstorf, 2007

## b. Precipitation




### Precipitation change (millimeters per day)



Source: Goddard Institute for Space Studies, [http://data.giss.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/precipcru/do\\_PRCmap.py?type=1&mean\\_gen=0112&year1=1980&year2=2000&base1=1951&base2=1980](http://data.giss.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/precipcru/do_PRCmap.py?type=1&mean_gen=0112&year1=1980&year2=2000&base1=1951&base2=1980) (accessed May 2009).

Note: Yellow denotes increased in precipitation in millimeters a day, blue denotes decreases from 1980 to present compared with the previous three decades. Drying has been greatest in continental interiors, while rainfall has become more intense in many coastal areas. The changing geographic distribution of rainfall has serious implications for agriculture.

## Map 5.4 Observed changes in annual precipitation 1961–2006



**Note:** Data are in mm per decade, blue means an increase, red a decrease. The observations indicate that large decadal scale variability in precipitation amount is superposed on the long time scale trends described above. This variability is partly related to the decadal scale variability in atmospheric circulation anomalies (see Box 5.1). Calculating trends over shorter time periods may therefore lead to different results.

**Source:** The climate dataset is from the EU-FP6 project ENSEMBLES (<http://www.ensembles-eu.org>) and the data providers in the ECA&D project (<http://eca.knmi.nl>).

## Number of events with relative trends




Fig. 1: Relative trends of loss relevant natural extreme events of the different perils


# Droughts

About 400,000,000 people live under extreme drought conditions



15% em 1970


Land considered “very dry” at global level:

38% em 2010



# Drought severity index is increasing






**Figure TS.13.** Characteristics of the summer 2003 heatwave: (a) JJA temperature anomaly with respect to 1961-1990; (b-d) June, July, August temperatures for Switzerland; (b) observed during 1864-2003; (c) simulated using a regional climate model for the period 1961-1990; (d) simulated for 2071-2100 under the SRES A2 scenario. The vertical bars in panels (b-d) represent mean summer surface temperature for each year of the time period considered; the fitted Gaussian distribution is indicated in black. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd. [Nature] (Schär et al., 2004), copyright 2004, [F12.4].

# Departure of Temperature from Average for Two Great Heat Waves


August 2003

July 2010




**Figure 1.** A comparison of August temperatures, the peak of the great European heat wave of 2003 (left) with July temperatures from the Great Russian Heat Wave of 2010 (right) reveals that this year's heat wave is more intense and covers a wider area of Europe.

# Inundações 1950-2009



Fuente: The international disaster data base. Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters. 2010.



Fonte, IPCC

## Number of events with relative trends





Fig. 1: Relative trends of loss relevant natural extreme events of the different perils


**Figure 2.2 Floods are increasing, even in drought-prone Africa**

**Events per five-year period**



*Source:* WDR team analysis from CRED 2009.

*Note:* Flood events are increasing everywhere but particularly in Africa, with new regions being exposed to flooding and with less recovery time between events. Reporting of events may have improved since the 1970s, but this is not the main cause of rising numbers of reported floods, because the frequency of other disaster events in Africa, such as droughts and earthquakes, has not shown a similar increase.



**Figure TS.13.** Characteristics of the summer 2003 heatwave: (a) JJA temperature anomaly with respect to 1961-1990; (b-d) June, July, August temperatures for Switzerland; (b) observed during 1864-2003; (c) simulated using a regional climate model for the period 1961-1990; (d) simulated for 2071-2100 under the SRES A2 scenario. The vertical bars in panels (b-d) represent mean summer surface temperature for each year of the time period considered; the fitted Gaussian distribution is indicated in black. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd. [Nature] (Schär et al., 2004), copyright 2004, [F12.4].

# The Elbe between Bitterfeld and Eilenburg, Germany 2002





Ilha da Madeira, 20 de Fevereiro de 2010



Ilha da Madeira, 20 de Fevereiro de 2010






Ilha da Madeira, 20 de Fevereiro de 2010




Bangladesh

# Drought severity index is increasing




**Map 2.5 Small and poor countries are financially vulnerable to extreme weather events**



Source: Mechler and others 2009.


Note: The map shows degree to which countries are financially vulnerable to floods and storms. For example, in countries shaded dark red a severe weather event that would exceed the public sector's financial ability to restore damaged infrastructure and continue with development as planned is expected about once every 11 to 50 years (an annual probability of 2–10 percent). The high financial vulnerability of small economies underscores the need for financial contingency planning to increase governments' resilience against future disasters. Only the 74 most disaster-prone countries that experienced direct losses of at least 1 percent of GDP due to floods, storms, and droughts during the past 30 years were included in the analysis.




	População	Economia	Ambiente	Equidade	Tecnologia	Globalização	Emissões
A1							
A2							
B1							
B2							

# 5<sup>th</sup> Assessment Report

## (a) Sequential approach



## (b) Parallel approach



**Figure 1.** Approaches to the development of global scenarios: (a) previous *sequential* approach; (b) proposed *parallel* approach. Numbers indicate analytical steps (2a and 2b proceed concurrently). Arrows indicate transfers of information (solid), selection of RCPs (dashed), and integration of information and feedbacks (dotted).

The anticipated time line for the production of these five products is depicted in Figure 2.






Figure 2. Timeline of key scenario development products (CMC = climate modeling community).


# Schematic for Global Atmospheric Model

Horizontal Grid (latitude - longitude)


Vertical Grid (height or pressure)

## Physical Processes in a Model






**FAQ 8.1, Figure 1.** *Global mean near-surface temperatures over the 20th century from observations (black) and as obtained from 58 simulations produced by 14 different climate models driven by both natural and human-caused factors that influence climate (yellow). The mean of all these runs is also shown (thick red line). Temperature anomalies are shown relative to the 1901 to 1950 mean. Vertical grey lines indicate the timing of major volcanic eruptions. (Figure adapted from Chapter 9, Figure 9.5. Refer to corresponding caption for further details.)*





# Multi-model Averages and Assessed Ranges for Surface Warming




Source, IPCC


# Projected Patterns of Precipitation Changes



©IPCC 2007: WG1-AR4




*Figure 2.10: Large-scale relative changes in annual runoff for the period 2090–2099, relative to 1980–1999. White areas are where less than 66% of the ensemble of 12 models agree on the sign of change, and hatched areas are where more than 90% of models agree on the sign of change (Milly et al., 2005). [Based on SYR Figure 3.5 and WGII Figure 3.4]*



**Figure 3.8.** Illustrative map of future climate change impacts on freshwater which are a threat to the sustainable development of the affected regions. 1: Bobba et al. (2000), 2: Barnett et al. (2004), 3: Döll and Flörke (2005), 4: Mirza et al. (2003) 5: Lehner et al. (2005a) 6: Kistemann et al. (2002). Background map: Ensemble mean change of annual runoff, in percent, between present (1981 to 2000) and 2081 to 2100 for the SRES A1B emissions scenario (after Nohara et al., 2006).


**Map 3.1** Water availability is projected to change dramatically by the middle of the 21st century in many parts of the world.



*Source:* Milly and others 2008; Milly, Dunne, and Vecchia 2005.


*Note:* The colors note percentage changes in annual runoff values (based on the median of 12 global climate models using the IPCC SRES A1B scenario) from 2041 to 2060 compared with 1900 to 1970. The white denotes areas where less than two-thirds of the models agree on whether runoff will increase or decrease. Runoff is equal to precipitation minus evaporation, but the values shown here are annual averages, which could mask seasonal variability in precipitation such as an increase in both floods and droughts.

# AMZ




Fonte, IPCC

# SSA




**Figure 11.14.** Temperature anomalies with respect to 1901 to 1950 for three Central and South American land regions for 1906 to 2005 (black line) and as simulated (red envelope) by MMD models incorporating known forcings; and as projected for 2001 to 2100 by MMD models for the A1B scenario (orange envelope). The bars at the end of the orange envelope represent the range of projected changes for 2091 to 2100 for the B1 scenario (blue), the A1B scenario (orange) and the A2 scenario (red). The black line is dashed where observations are present for less than 50% of the area in the decade concerned. More details on the construction of these figures are given in Box 11.1 and Section 11.1.2.


Fonte, IPCC



Fonte, IPCC



**Figure 11.15.** Temperature and precipitation changes over Central and South America from the MMD-A1B simulations. Top row: Annual mean, DJF and JJA temperature change between 1980 to 1999 and 2080 to 2099, averaged over 21 models. Middle row: same as top, but for fractional change in precipitation. Bottom row: number of models out of 21 that project increases in precipitation.



**Figure TS.18.** Results from a recent study showing estimated millions of people per annum at risk globally from coastal flooding. Blue bars: numbers at risk without sea-level rise; purple bars: numbers at risk with sea-level rise. [T6.6]




**Figure TS.8.** Relative vulnerability of coastal deltas as indicated by estimates of the population potentially displaced by current sea-level trends to 2050 (extreme >1 million; high 1 million to 50,000; medium 50,000 to 5,000) [B6.3]. Climate change would exacerbate these impacts.

	Negative impact	Positive impact
<b>Very high confidence</b> Malaria: contraction and expansion, changes in transmission season		
<b>High confidence</b> Increase in malnutrition		
Increase in the number of people suffering from deaths, disease and injuries from extreme weather events		
Increase in the frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases from changes in air quality		
Change in the range of infectious disease vectors		
Reduction of cold-related deaths		
<b>Medium confidence</b> Increase in the burden of diarrhoeal diseases		


**Figure TS.9.** *Direction and magnitude of change of selected health impacts of climate change.*

Map FA.2 Potential tipping elements in the climate system: Global distribution




Source: Adapted from Lenton and others 2008.

Note: Several regional-scale features of the climate system have tipping points, meaning that a small climate perturbation at a critical point could trigger an abrupt or irreversible shift in the system. These could be triggered this century depending on the pace and magnitude of climate change.





————— Efeitos directos ou retroacção  
..... Efeitos indirectos



Source, J. Houghton, 1994


# As emissões anuais recentes de gases com efeito de estufa são próximas dos cenários mais gravosos do IPCC





Marland et al, 2007


# Vulnerability vs. emissions



Highest vulnerability towards climate change vs. largest CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (from fossil fuel combustion and cement production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

-  Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability
-  Areas with highest ecological vulnerability
-  Largest per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emitters
-  Largest per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emitters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability


Source, W. Cramer, 2007



*Figure SPM 3a: Year 2004 distribution of regional per capita GHG emissions (all Kyoto gases, including those from land-use) over the population of different country groupings. The percentages in the bars indicate a regions share in global GHG emissions [Figure 1.4a].*

Fonte, IPCC



Figure 3 – CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita according to per capita GDP in the world in 2002.



*A 1% increase in GDP per capita leads to an estimated increase of about 0.9% in emissions per capita. The fact that the emissions figure is less than 1% indicates that emissions increase at a slower pace than economic growth.*

*Source: World Bank.*


# Global “reasons for concern”




- I Risks to Unique and Threatened Systems
- II Risks from Extreme Climate Events
- III Distribution of Impacts
- IV Aggregate Impacts
- V Risks from Future Large-Scale Discontinuities

Source: Smith et al 2001, TAR IPCC WG II


# Climate change as a driver of social destabilization and threat to international security



# Climate change as a driver of social destabilization and threat to international security




Consequences of climate change for ecosystems and economic sectors at different levels of warming,  
Source: Stern, 2006



Source: Adapted from Parry and others 2007.

**Map FB.1** While many of the projected ecosystem changes are in boreal or desert areas that are not biodiversity hotspots, there are still substantial areas of overlap and concern



*Source:* WDR team based on Myers and others (2000) and Fischlin and others (2007).

*Note:* The figure shows the overlap between biodiversity hotspots (Conservation International and Myers and others 2000) and the projected changes in terrestrial ecosystems by 2100 relative to the year 2000, as presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Fischlin and others (2007), figure 4.3 (a), p. 238. The changes should be taken as only indicative of the range of possible ecosystem changes and include gains or losses of forest cover, grassland, shrub- and woodland, herbaceous cover, and desert amelioration.

# Trajectórias das emissões de CO<sub>2</sub>e

(2005 = 380 ppmv)





Figure 4.6 Where the world needs to go: energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita (metric tons)

25




Source: Adapted from NRC 2008, based on data from World Bank 2008e.

Note: Emissions and GDP per capita are from 1980 to 2005.

## Business-as-usual (BAU) comparisons between V2.0 and V2.1

- Peak at 550 ppm, long-term stabilization 550 ppm, expected 3°C increase
- Peak at 510 ppm, long-term stabilization 450 ppm, expected 2°C increase
- Peak at 480 ppm, long-term stabilization 400 ppm, expected 1.8°C increase


Global GHG emissions  
GtCO<sub>2</sub>e per year



Note: As a reference, 1990 total emissions were 36 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e.

Source: Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.0, v2.1; IEA; US EPA; Houghton; IPCC; OECD; den Elzen; Meinshausen; van Vuuren



**Figure 3.4 Intensive beef production is a heavy producer of greenhouse gas emissions**



*Source:* Williams, Audsley, and Sandars 2006.

*Note:* The figure shows CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions in kilograms resulting from the production (in an industrial country) of 1 kilogram of a specific product. The car and road image conveys the number of kilometers one must drive in a gasoline-powered car averaging 11.5 kilometers a liter to produce the given amount of CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions. For example, producing 1 kilogram of beef and driving 79.1 kilometers both result in 16 kilograms of emissions.


# Redução das Emissões Globais de CO<sub>2</sub> do Sector da Energia no Cenário de 450 ppmv



Fonte:AIE

***•An additional \$10.5 trillion of investment is needed in total in the 450 Scenario, with measures to boost energy efficiency accounting for most of the abatement through to 2030***


# World Greenhouse gas emissions by sector



All data is for 2000. All calculations are based on CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents, using 100-year global warming potentials from the IPCC (1996), based on a total global estimate of 41 755 MtCO<sub>2</sub> equivalent. Land use change includes both emissions and absorptions. Dotted lines represent flows of less than 0.1% percent of total GHG emissions.

Source: World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT), Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy, December 2005; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1996 (data for 2000).

# Percentagem de Tecnologias de Carbono-Zero ou Baixo na Geração de Electricidade no Cenário de 450 ppmv




Fonte: AIE

- *In the 450 Scenario, low- & zero-carbon technologies account for 60% of world electricity generation by 2030, up from 32% today*

# Quanto Custa?

## Investimento Adicional no Cenário de 450 ppmv Relativamente ao Cenário de Referência




Fonte: AIE

***•\$10.5 trillion of additional investment is needed in the 450 Scenario in the period 2010-2030 compared with the Reference Scenario, costing 0.5% of GDP in 2020 & 1.1% of GDP in 2030***

**Figure 4.11** The goal is to push low-carbon technologies from unproven concept to widespread deployment and to higher emission reductions


CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction potential (Gt/year)



Source: WDR team, based on data from World Bank 2008a and IEA 2008a (mitigation potential from IEA Blue Scenario in 2050).

Note: See table 4.4 for detailed definitions of technology development stage. A given technology group can be progressing through different stages at the same time but in different country settings and at different scales. Wind, for example, is already cost competitive with gas-fired power plants in most of the United States (Wiser and Bolinger 2008). But in China and India wind may be economically but not financially viable against coal-fired power plants. So for clean technologies to be adopted in more places and at larger scales, they must move from the top to bottom in table 4.4.


**Figure 22. Unit costs of energy technologies: proportion of fossil-fuel alternative, 2015, 2025 and 2050**



Source: Anderson, D. (2006).

<sup>53</sup> See Barker, T. et al. (2002).

# General Outlook





# Lidar com a incerteza em políticas climáticas

Sem Políticas climáticas

Estabilização do CO<sub>2</sub> em 550ppm:


Uma nova roda com políticas




Fuente: MIT, 2009

# Pontos críticos

na interferência sobre o sistema climático



# Impactos das alterações climáticas na produção agrícola



Emissões acumuladas desde 1950: 75% dos países desenvolvidos e 25% dos países em desenvolvimentos

# Medidas de Adaptação

## Procura de Recursos Hídricos

1. Aumento da eficiência no uso da água por meio da reciclagem;
2. Redução da procura de água para irrigação por meio de alterações na:
  - a) Calendarização das culturas
  - b) Composição e variedade dos cultivares;
  - c) Métodos de irrigação
  - d) Área de plantio
3. Redução da procura de água para irrigação por importação de produtos agrícolas, ou seja, água virtual e otimização à escala global.

## Procura de Recursos Hídricos (cont.)

4. Promoção das práticas locais indígenas de uso sustentável da água
5. Melhor uso dos mercados da água para redistribuição da procura no sentido dos usos mais indispensáveis e sustentáveis;
6. Melhor uso de incentivos económicos e financeiros, incluindo a contagem e valorização para encorajar a conservação da água.

Obrigado pela Atenção

Figure 2.1: Annual Growth Rates from 1990 to 2005 vs. Income Level in 1990






Figure 2.2(a): The Convergence of Global Income per Capita through 2050



Source: Calculated using data from World Bank (2007)

Note: Vertical axis on logarithmic scale. Income is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for difference in price levels across countries.

Figure 2.2(b): World Product through 2050



Source: Calculated using data from World Bank (2007)